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Abstract
We propose to use modal logic as a logic for coalgebras and discuss it in view of the
work done on coalgebras as a semantics of object-oriented programming. Two approaches are
taken: First, standard concepts of modal logic are applied to coalgebras. For a certain kind of
functor it is shown that the logic exactly captures the notion of bisimulation and a complete
calculus is given. Examples of veri1cations of object properties are given. Second, we discuss
the relationship of this approach with the coalgebraic logic of Moss (Coalgebraic logic, Ann.
Pure Appl. Logic 96 (1999) 277–317.). c© 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Coalgebras have been used in Reichel [20] and Jacobs [14] to formalise the notion of
classes and objects in object-oriented programming. As for algebras, they use equational
logic to specify coalgebras (i.e., classes and objects). An account of the connection
between equational speci1cations and coalgebras is given by Hensel and Reichel [11]
and Jacobs [13]. In this paper I propose a diBerent approach: to use modal logic for
the speci1cation of coalgebras. The reasons are the following.
First, coalgebras are generalisations of transition systems and modal logic has been a
natural choice whenever a logic for some transition systems was needed. It is therefore
tempting to explore the relations between coalgebras and modal logic.
Second, coalgebras are used here to describe classes. Roughly speaking, given a
coalgebra (S; f : S→FS) (S a set, F a functor, f a function) the state of an object
is represented by an element s∈ S. Now, looking for a logic to specify methods we
should respect the idea of encapsulation: We do not want to talk about states, which
are supposed to be non-observable, but only about observable behaviour. Modal logic
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is an obvious choice: Formulas of modal logic are evaluated in states but generally
do not refer explicitly to speci1c states. Compared to equational logic a conceptual
advantage is that equations between states can be avoided.
We will discuss two approaches to use the ideas of modal logic. First, given a certain
kind of functor, 1nd a translation of the corresponding coalgebras to Kripke models.
Then apply results of modal logic to the Kripke models and transfer them back to
coalgebras. This has the advantage that the well-developed machinery of modal logic
can easily be used but the drawback that the translation does not generalise to arbitrary
functors. Therefore, the second approach is to use the coalgebraic logic of Moss [19].
This logic has the advantage that its syntax is derived from the functor itself and does
not depend on a non-canonical detour via Kripke models.
A third approach, due to Martin RGoHiger [21], may be viewed as an intermediate
one. By analysing functors as syntax trees, he manages to give a systematic description
of modal logics for a larger class of functors than it is done in this paper. On the other
side, as an advantage to Moss’ approach, the logics still contain the intuitive modal
operators. Comparing to our work, one should note that RGoHiger’s results could also
be obtained via a translation, albeit a more complicated one, of coalgebras into Kripke
models.
The paper is organised as follows. Sections 2 and 3 review the essentials on coal-
gebras and modal logic needed here. Section 4 introduces our modal language for
coalgebras and relates modally de1nable classes of coalgebras to 1nal coalgebras.
Section 5 shows that the expressive power of the logic allows to de1ne elements
of coalgebras up to bisimulation and then a complete calculus for the logic is given.
We also comment on the relation of the canonical model for a modal logic and the
1nal coalgebra. Section 6 shows by examples that the logic allows for natural proofs
of properties of programs. Section 7 relates our modal language to Moss’ coalge-
braic logic. Section 8 discusses the approach of this paper in view of object oriented
programming.
2. Coalgebras
We recall the basic de1nitions, show how coalgebras may be used to describe objects
and classes, and introduce the examples that are used in this paper. We mainly follow
Jacobs [14].
Set is the category of sets with functions as morphisms. We only consider coalgebras
in the category SetF , i.e., a coalgebra is a pair (S; f : S→FS) where S a set, F a functor
on Set and f a function. 1 Coalgebras can be used to describe classes and objects.
The functor F speci1es the type of the methods, f the eBect of the methods. The
state of an object is represented by an element s∈ S, f(s) describing the results of the
methods when sent to s.
1 For the de1nition of a morphism in SetF see the end of this section.
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The functors we consider are of the form
F(S)= (B1 + C1× S)A1 × · · · (Bn + Cn× S)An :
How this describes the number and type of the methods of the class will become clear
in the following example. Let us consider a one-cell buBer with two operations store
and read . store is supposed to put an element in the buBer, read should output the
current element or yield an error message if the buBer is empty. Writing A for the set
of elements that the buBer may contain and 1 for the one-element set containing the
error message, the signature becomes
store : S ×A→ S; read : S→ 1 + A× S:
Using the isomorphism (S ×A→ S)  (S→ SA) we can write store and read as one
function
〈store; read〉 : S→ SA× (1 + A× S):
That is, the functor F in our example is given by
F(S)= SA× (1 + A× S):
The second example we will consider is a LIFO-queue with two operations in :
S ×A→ S and out : S→ 1 + A× S where again A denotes the set of possible elements
to be stored in the queue and 1 is the set containing the error message. Both examples
have the same functor. That their behaviour is diBerent will be expressed by the modal
logic presented in Section 4.
One of the advantages of viewing transition systems as coalgebras is that, once the
functor is given, there is a canonical notion of bisimulation. This is due to the fact that
functors are not only de1ned on sets but also on functions: Let F(S)= (B1+C1× S)A1×
· · · (Bn + Cn× S)An and h : S→ S ′ be a function, then Fh :FS→FS ′ takes a tuple of
functions (g1; : : : ; gn); gi ∈Ai→Bi+Ci× S to a tuple of functions (g′1; : : : ; g′n); g′i ∈Ai→
Bi + Ci× S ′, where the g′i are de1ned as follows (a; b; c; t are in Ai; Bi; Ci; S, respec-
tively):
g′i(a)=
{
b if gi(a)= b;
(c; h(t)) if gi(a)= (c; t):
Now, we can de1ne a homomorphism (or morphism for short) between two coalgebras
(S; f); (S ′; f′)∈SetF to be a function h : S→ S ′ s.t. f′ ◦h=Fh◦f. It is not diMcult to
show that this de1nition of a morphism of coalgebras corresponds to the usual de1nition
of a functional bisimulation. A bisimulation between two coalgebras (S; f); (T; g) is
a relation R⊂ S ×T such that there exists a function r :R→FR together with two
coalgebra morphisms (R; r)→ (S; f) and (R; r)→ (T; g). R is a total bisimulation iB
these two coalgebra morphisms are surjective. We write (S; s)F (T; t) iB there is a
bisimulation between (S; f); (T; g) containing (s; t).
To simplify notation we assume the sets Bi; Ci to be disjoint. Also, we will write S
for (S; f) if there is no danger of confusion.
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3. Modal logic
In this section we review some basics of modal logic needed later. 2 The modal
logics considered in this paper are extensions of propositional logic. A modal language
L consists of the propositional connectives, a set of atomic propositions P and a set
of unary modal operators that we write as {[i] : i∈ I}, I a set.
Given a modal language with atomic propositions P and modal operators {[i] : i∈ I},
a Kripke frame (W;R) for this language is given by a set of worlds W (also called
states) and a family of relations R=(Ri)i∈I ; Ri⊂W ×W . wRiv should be read as “there
is a transition labelled i from state w to state v”. A Kripke model (W;R; V ) for the
given language consists of a Kripke frame (W;R) and a mapping, called valuation,
V :P→P(W ) that assigns to every atomic proposition a set of worlds. The natural
notion of a morphism of Kripke models is that of a functional bisimulation, tradi-
tionally called p-morphism. A p-morphism f : (W;R; V )→ (W ′;R′; V ′) is a function
f :W →W ′ satisfying (i) wRiv⇒f(w)R′if(v), (ii) f(w)R′iv′⇒∃v :wRiv and f(v)= v′
and (iii) w∈V (p)⇔f(w)∈V ′(p).
The semantics of modal logic in terms of transition systems is de1ned as follows.
Given a formula ’ of the language and a Kripke model for the language M =(W;R; V )
and a world w∈W of the model, the relation M;w |=’ is de1ned for the propositional
connectives as to be expected and for atomic propositions and modal operators as
follows:
M;w |=p iB p∈P and w∈V (p);
M; w |= [i]’ iB ∀v :wRiv ⇒ M; v |=’:
As usual, M |=’ is de1ned by quantifying over all worlds, and |=’ iB M |=’ for
all M . Similarly, given a frame T =(W;R) and w∈W , T; w |=’ iB (W;R; V ); w |=’
for all valuations V :P→P(W ). T |=’ iB T; w |=’ for all w∈W . For  a set of
formulas and ’ a formula, the consequence relation  |=’ is to be understood in its
global sense, that is,  |=’⇔∀M (M |= ⇒ M |=’). The theory of a world w in a
model (or frame) S is Th(S; w)= {’ : S; w |=’} and Th(S)= {’ : S |=’}. Two models
or frames are called logically equivalent (or sometimes equivalent for short) iB they
have the same theory.
p-Morphisms preserve and reQect satisfaction of formulas in every world of a model.
Moreover, if f :M →M ′ a (surjective) p-morphism then M |=’ if (and only if)
M ′ |=’.
Given a modal language L, the modal logic determined by all Kripke models for
L is named KL, i.e., KL= {’ :M |=’ for all models M for L}. KL has a strongly
complete axiomatisation given by the axioms and rules below. To simplify notation we
2 For more details see e.g. Goldblatt [5].
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use  as syntactic variable for the modal operators [i]:
(taut) all propositional tautologies,
(dist) (’→  )→  ’→   for all  of L;
(mp) from ’; ’→  derive  ,
(nec) from ’ derive ’ for all  of L:
Strictly speaking, (dist) is not an axiom but an axiom scheme, i.e. all instances of
(dist) with formulas of L substituted for ’;  are axioms. Following a common abuse
of language we will often simply speak of axioms.
For  a set of formulas and ’ a formula,   ’ means that there is a 1nite derivation
of ’ using only the axioms and rules and the formulas in . The above calculus is
sound and strongly complete, that is,   ’⇔ |=’.
4. Modal logic as a specication language for coalgebras
First, we de1ne the modal language that we will use to specify coalgebras, we give
a semantics and we show – using the examples from Section 2 – that it allows for an
intuitive formalisation of properties. We also show that modal logic avoids equations
between states in a natural way. Second, it is shown that formulas are invariant under
morphisms and modally de1nable classes of coalgebras are related to 1nal coalgebras.
4.1. Language, semantics, examples
We 1rst need a modal language. The set of propositions and the set of modal
operators are determined by the functor F(S) = (B1+C1×S)A1×· · · (Bn+Cn×S)An in
the following way. For each component (Bi+Ci× S)Ai and each a∈Ai there is a modal
operator [i; a]. And for each d∈Bi +Ci we have an atomic proposition (i; a)=d (read
as “output of message i with argument value a is d”). In the case that A contains only
one element we prefer to write simply [i] and i=d. This gives a modal language LF .
As an illustration consider the example of the one-cell buBer of Section 2. (Recall
that n=2, A1 =A and A2 a one element set.) Suppose we want to specify that a store
into the empty buBer stores indeed, that a store into a full buBer has no eBect and that
a read empties the buBer. Then – writing [store(a)] for [1; a], [read] for [2], read =d
for 2=d, and error for the element of 1 – we can formalise the conditions above as
follows:
read = error→ [store(a)]read = a;
read = a→ [store(b)]read = a;
[read]read = error.
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Note that the above expressions are not strictly speaking formulas of our modal lan-
guage. They are axiom schemes that yield formulas for all a; b∈A.
Having gained some intuition, here is the de1nition of the language and its semantics.
Denition 4.1 (The modal language LF). Let F be a functor on Set of the form
F(S)= (B1 + C1× S)A1 × · · · (Bn + Cn× S)An . Then the set of atomic propositions P
for F consists of propositions (i; a)=d for all 16i6n; a∈Ai; d∈Bi+Ci. The modal
language obtained from P by adding the constant ⊥, boolean connectives and modal
operators [i; a] for all 16i6n; a∈Ai is called LF . 〈i; a〉’ is an abbreviation for
¬[i; a]¬’.
Note that given the modal language we automatically have a semantics in terms of
Kripke models as has been recalled in the previous section. Here we give a semantics
of the language in terms of coalgebras. The two semantics are related in Section 5.1.
Denition 4.2 (Semantics |=F of LF). Let (S; f) be a F-coalgebra, s∈ S, ’ a for-
mula of LF , and F(S)= (B1 + C1× S)A1 × · · · (Bn + Cn× S)An . The semantics for
boolean connectives is as usual. For propositions and modal operators
s |=F (i; a)=d iB (!i ◦ f)(s)(a)=d or
there is t ∈ S s.t. (!i ◦ f)(s)(a)= (d; t),
s |=F [i; a]’ iB for all c∈Ci; t ∈ S (!i ◦ f)(s)(a)= (c; t)⇒ t |=F ’.
Note that the “or” on the right-hand side of the 1rst clause corresponds to the “+”
in (Bi + Ci× S)Ai .
The satisfaction relation |=F is always relative to a speci1c coalgebra (S; f). If we
want to emphasise this, we write (S; f); s |=F ’ (or sometimes simply S; s |=F ’). For
a theory of (S; f) in state s we write ThF(S; s)= {’ : S; s |=F ’}.
Next, we want to show how to specify and prove properties of newly created ob-
jects. The natural way to do this in our approach is to add a predicate New to the
language having the newly created states as its extension. Such a predicate may easily
be expressed in the coalgebraic setting by considering the functor Bool×F(S) instead
of F(S), where Bool denotes the set of truth values {true; false}. In other words, the
characteristic function S→Bool of New is added to the description of the class. This
is seen to be compatible with the functors being of the form
F(S) = (B1 + C1 × S)A1 × · · · (Bn + Cn × S)An
since we may choose A1 to be a one-element set, C1 to be empty, and B1 =Bool. In the
corresponding language LF we write new to denote the atomic proposition 1= true.
For an example consider the LIFO-queue below.
Before analysing more of the properties of this logic, we want to emphasise that
modal logic gives us the appropriate language when we are not interested in particular
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states but only in states up to bisimulation. To make this clear let us specify the
LIFO-queue from Section 2. We 1rst require
[in(a)]out = a;
New → out = error
meaning that out yields a after input of a and that a newly created queue is empty.
But something still lacks. How can we express that doing an out after an in gives us
the “same” queue as before? Of course we do not want to say that we really get the
same queue. Since states are not observable what should be said is: doing out after
in gives us a queue that has the same behaviour as the queue before. This can be
expressed in our formalism by writing down the following axiom scheme: 3
[in(a)][out]’ ↔ ’:
Note that specifying the above property with equational logic forces us to use not only
equations between attributes but between states (cf. the discussion in [14]). Modal
logic avoids the direct access to states in a natural way. That the above axiom scheme
expresses indeed the intended constraint on the behaviours is implied by Theorem 5.1.
Last, we want to make the connection to RGoHiger [21]. In his Remark 2:5 it is
shown that for the functors considered here the two logics coincide. In the LIFO-
example, disregarding the new (i.e. taking as functor F(S)= SA× (1 + A × S)), the
remaining two axioms from above become
[×1a](×2+2×1)a;
[×1a][×2+2×2]’ ↔ ’:
4.2. Some properties of the logic
As to be expected, validity of formulas is invariant under morphisms and bisimula-
tions.
Proposition 4.3. Given two F-coalgebras and a morphism h : (S; f)→ (T; g) we have
(S; f); s |=F ’ ⇔ (T; g); h(s) |=F ’:
Proof. The proof is the usual induction on the structure of the formulas. Let us look
at two cases. Let a∈Ai; c∈Ci. First, ’ is (i; a)= c: S; s |=F (i; a)= c iB ∃s′ ∈ S :
(!i ◦ f)(s)(a)= (c; s′) iB ∃s′ ∈ S : (!i ◦ Fh ◦ f)(s)(a)= (c; h(s′)) iB ∃t′ ∈T : (!i ◦ g ◦
h)(s)(a)= (c; t′) iB T; h(s) |=F (i; a)= c.
3 The scheme denotes the set of all its instances with formulas of LF substituted for ’ (and elements of
A substituted for a).
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Second, ’ is [i; a] , s′ ∈ S; t′ ∈T . Then S; s |=F [i; a] iB (!i◦f)(s)(a)= (c; s′)⇒ S;
s′ |=F  iB (!i ◦f)(s)(a)= (c; s′)⇒ T; h(s′) |=F  iB (!i ◦Fh◦f)(s)(a)= (c; h(s′))⇒ T;
h(s′) |=F  iB (!i ◦ g ◦ h)(s)(a)= (c; t′)⇒ T; t′ |=F  iB T; h(s) |=F  .
Then as a corollary of the above proposition we get that if (S; s)F (T; t) then also
ThF(S; s) = ThF(T; t).
Next, let us take a look at modally de1nable classes of coalgebras. Let F be a
functor as described above and ⊂LF a set of formulas. Consider the class
Mod() = {(S; f) ∈ SetF : for all s ∈ S; ’ ∈ : (S; f); s |=F ’}
of (coalgebra-) models of . Obviously, Mod() gives rise to a full subcategory of
SetF . And it is closely related to the coalgebra T that is de1ned as the largest sub-
coalgebra of the 1nal coalgebra T whose carrier is contained in {t ∈T : t |=F }: 4 As
shown by the next theorem, speci1cations in modal logic work by de1ning subcoalge-
bras of the 1nal coalgebra.
Theorem 4.4. Let ⊂LF . Then S ∈Mod() i; there is a (necessarily unique) mor-
phism S→T.
Proof. “Only if ”: Let T be the 1nal coalgebra in SetF (that exists and is explicitly
described in [14]). There is a unique morphism h : S→T . Since S |= the image of
S is contained in the carrier of T, therefore h factors uniquely through T, 5 giving
rise to a unique morphism S→T.
“if ”: Immediate by de1nition of T and Proposition 4.3.
A class of models K is said to be closed under bisimulations whenever from S ∈K
and R a total bisimulation between S; S ′ it follows S ′ ∈K . It is called a covariety
when it is closed under images, subcoalgebras and disjoint unions. We follow Gumm
and SchrGoder [8] and call covarieties that are closed under bisimulations complete
covarieties. With this de1nition we get as an immediate corollary.
Corollary 4.5. Let ⊂LF . Then Mod() is a complete covariety.
Proof. That Mod() is a covariety follows from the theorem above and Rutten
[22, Theorem 15:1]. Closure under bisimulations is an obvious consequence of
Proposition 4.3.
Gumm and SchrGoder [8] analyse logics where the converse (i.e. any complete co-
variety is de1nable by a set of formulas) also holds. See the paragraphs following
Theorem 5.1 for a discussion or how this relates to our case.
4 Existence of T follows from Theorem 6:4 in [22].
5 Theorem 7:1 in [22].
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5. Transferring results from modal logic
One reason why it is nice to use modal logic as a speci1cation language is that the
theory of modal logics gives us a lot of tools to design appropriate logics, to prove
results about these logics, and to work with the logics (interactive theorem provers,
model checkers). To get access to this area we give a translation of coalgebras into
Kripke models and show that the coalgebraic semantics of LF coincides with Kripke
semantics. This translation may then be used to transfer results from modal logic. In this
paper it is used to show that LF allows us to de1ne behaviours up to bisimulation
and to give a complete axiomatisation of LF . In connection with the completeness
proof we also discuss the relationship of the canonical model for LF and the 1nal
F-coalgebra.
5.1. The translation
The logic LF has been given a semantics in terms of coalgebras. On the other
hand, like any modal logic in the style of Section 3, it has also a semantics w.r.t.
Kripke models. The connection between both is given by a translation of the category
of F-coalgebras into the category of Kripke models for LF . It is a full and faithful
embedding preserving and reQecting all interesting logical properties.
Let F be a functor on Set of the form F(S) = (B1 +C1×S)A1×· · · (Bn+Cn×S)An .
The category KF of F-Kripke models is given as follows. Let P be the set of atomic
propositions for the functor F (see De1nition 4.1). Then a F-Kripke model is a Kripke
model (W;R; V ) where W is a set, R is a family (Ri; a)16i6n; a∈ Ai of relations and V :
P→P(W ) a mapping from propositions into the powerset of W . Since the methods
are supposed to be functions we have the following restrictions on the relations and
on the extensions of the propositions. For all w∈W; 16i6n; a∈Ai; b∈Bi; c∈Ci
the following hold:
(i)w∈V ((i; a) = b)⇒ w has no Ri; a-successor,
(ii)w∈V ((i; a) = c)⇒ w has exactly one Ri; a-successor,
(iii) in w holds exactly one proposition of {(i; a) = d :d∈Bi + Ci}.
The morphisms in the category KF are the p-morphisms (see Section 3). Note that KF
is a full subcategory of the category of Kripke models for LF . In the following we
will see that SetF and KF are equivalent (even isomorphic).
We de1ne two functors sk :SetF →KF and ks :KF →SetF which will be isomor-
phisms that preserve in particular logical equivalence and bisimilarity.
sk :SetF →KF maps every F-coalgebra (S; f) to the F-Kripke model (S;R; V ) where
(s; t) ∈ Ri; a ⇔ ∃c ∈ Ci : (!i ◦ f)(s)(a) = (c; t);
s ∈ V ((i; a) = b)⇔ (!i ◦ f)(s)(a) = b;
s ∈ V ((i; a) = c)⇔ ∃t ∈ S : (!i ◦ f)(s)(a) = (c; t):
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ks :KF →SetF maps every F-Kripke model (S;R; V ) to the F-coalgebra (S; f) where
(!i ◦ f)(s)(a) = b ⇔ s ∈ V ((i; a) = b);
(!i ◦ f)(s)(a) = (c; t)⇔ s ∈ V ((i; a) = c) and (s; t) ∈ Ri; a:
On morphisms sk and ks are the identity.
sk and ks are isomorphisms that preserve all interesting properties. We need in
particular
(a) S; s |=F ’ ⇔ sk(S); s |=’,
(b) (M; s)  (N; t)⇒ (ks(M); s)F (ks(N ); t),
(c) ks ◦ sk = idSetF .
5.2. Logical equivalence implies bisimilarity
Logical equivalence implies bisimilarity. The proof uses the well-known fact that
this property holds for image-1nite Kripke models.
Theorem 5.1. ThF(S; s)=ThF(T; t)⇒ (S; s)F (T; t).
Proof. Suppose ThF(S; s)=ThF(T; t). Then Th(sk(S); s)=Th(sk(T ); t) by (a). Since
sk(S) and sk(T ) are so-called image-=nite Kripke models, logical equivalence implies
bisimilarity, that is, (sk(S); s)  (sk(T ); t). By (b) and (c) we get (S; s)F (T; t).
The argument remains valid if we would allow the functors F to be built from
the 1nite powerset functor. 6 More generally, the above argument is possible when-
ever the translation into Kripke models yields a class of models having the so-called
Hennessy–Milner property. For detailed discussions of this concept see Goldblatt [7]
and Hollenberg [12].
Note also that our expressiveness result is not strong enough to get the converse of
Corollary 4.5. To achieve this we would either need a “global” version of the above
theorem saying ThF(S)=ThF(T )⇒ S F T or a logic with in1nite conjunctions and
disjunctions. See Gumm and SchrGoder [8] for a proof in the latter case.
5.3. Axiomatisations
Our next aim is to give a complete axiomatisation of the logic LF . The strategy is
to use again the translation of coalgebras into Kripke models. First we need to 1nd the
set )F of axioms. If we then can show that KF |=’ ⇒ )F |=’ we get a completeness
result for |=F from the completeness result of modal logic. Unfortunately, to 1nd a
strong enough set )F , the restriction to 1nite output sets Bi; Ci is needed. We give a
complete axiomatisation for this restricted case using the canonical model for LF and
comment on the relation of the 1nal coalgebra and the canonical model. Then we show
6 For example, functors described by F ::=C | Id |F +F |F×F |FC |P! where C a constant functor and
P! the 1nite covariant powerset functor.
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why the restriction to 1nite output sets is needed, and sketch some possible ways to
overcome this.
Let again F be given by F(S)= (B1 + C1 × S)A1 × · · · (Bn + Cn × S)An . To 1nd )F
recall the de1nition of KF in Section 5.1. The restrictions on the models expressed
there (see (i)–(iii)) have now to be formulated using modal formulas. Recall that
[i; a]⊥ expresses that a world has no successor and that [i; a]’→〈i; a〉’ expresses that
a world has at least one successor (cf. [5]). Furthermore, 〈i; a〉’→ [i; a]’ expresses
(on frames and also on the canonical model, see the proof of the theorem below) that
every world has at most one successor. We therefore get the following axioms ((Ax1)
corresponding to (i) and (Ax2), (Ax3) to (ii)):
(Ax1) (i; a)= b→ [i; a]⊥ for all b∈Bi,
(Ax2) (i; a)= c→ ([i; a]’→〈i; a〉’) for all c∈Ci; ’∈LF ,
(Ax3) 〈i; a〉’→ [i; a]’.
Next we have to express that each method yields exactly one output value. At this
point (see (Ax5)) we need that all the sets Bi; Ci are 1nite:
(Ax4) (i; a)=d→¬(i; a)=d′ for all d = d′; d; d′ ∈Bi + Ci,
(Ax5)
∨
d∈Bi+Ci (i; a)=d.
Let )F be the set of LF -formulas de1ned by the 1ve axiom schemes above.
Theorem 5.2 (Completeness for |=F). Let there be a functor on Set F(S)= (B1+C1×
S)A1 × · · · (Bn + Cn × S)An with all the Bi; Ci =nite sets and let ’ be a LF -formula
and  be a set of LF -formulas. Then  |=F ’ ⇔  ∪ )F’.
Proof. “⇐” is a standard correctness proof. For “⇒”, using the translation of
Section 5.1, it is enough to show that ∪)F =’ implies the existence of a model
M ∈KF :M |= & M =| ’. We de1ne MF =(WF;RF ; V F) to be the canonical model 7
of ∪)F . That is, WF is the set of maximal (∪)F)-consistent sets of LF -formulas,
wRFi; av ⇔ (∀ ∈LF : [i; a] ∈w ⇒  ∈ v), w∈VF(p)⇔ p∈w. The canonical model
has the property that MF; w |=  ⇔  ∈w. Therefore  ∪ )F =’ implies that there is
w∈W such that MF; w =| ’. Also, by construction MF |=. It remains to show that
MF ∈KF . That (Ax1), (Ax2), (Ax4), (Ax5) enforce the intended conditions on MF
should be obvious. That (Ax3) implies that any world in MF has at most one RFi; a
successor is an easy exercise that may be found in [5].
We have shown that the canonical model MF for LF is in KF and hence can be
thought of as a F-coalgebra. Is MF also the 1nal coalgebra? This is indeed the case
(cf. RGoHiger [21, Theorem 7:1]): given any coalgebra S de1ne a function h : S→MF
via f(s)=Th(S; s). It is easy to show that h is well de1ned and satis1es conditions
(i) and (iii) of the de1nition of a p-morphism. For condition (ii) use that any world
in MF has at most one RFi; a successor. Uniqueness of h is obvious. Hence M
F is 1nal
in KF . But it is important to note that for more general functors the canonical model
7 See e.g. Goldblatt [5] for details.
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is not the 1nal coalgebra. The reason is that the canonical model can be understood
as the disjoint union of all models quotiented by logical equivalence whereas the 1nal
coalgebra is the quotient w.r.t. bisimulation which, generally, is a 1ner equivalence
relation. Consequently, in cases where the logic is too weak to characterise worlds up
to bisimulation, the existence of a morphism into the canonical model will fail (but if
it exists it is unique).
Back to the completeness result, we have shown that if Bi; Ci are 1nite the calculus
for KLF as presented in Section 3 together with )F as axioms is a strongly complete
calculus for LF . We will call it CF .
How can we get rid of the restriction that the sets of output values Bi; Ci are 1nite?
Possible ideas are to use modal predicate logic or to allow in1nite conjunctions. But
then it could be that completeness is lost. Here, we want to make a diBerent proposal.
It seems natural to allow that methods do not yield any output unless they are forced to
do so by the axioms of the speci1cation. In other words, the fact that methods are not
partial is not any more expressed automatically by the syntax but has to be speci1ed
in the axiomatic part. We then do not need (Ax5) any more. This may seem to render
the task of specifying more complicated but looking at our two examples from above
we see that no changes to the axioms are necessary.
To be more explicit, things work out as follows. De1ne KF
−
as KF but allowing
models that have states where ¬(i; a)=d holds for all d∈Bi +Ci. De1ne )F− as )F
but without (Ax5). We then can allow the sets Bi; Ci to be arbitrary. The proof of the
theorem can be adopted almost literally. We therefore get a strongly complete calculus
CF
−
for |=F− .
To summarise from a more practical point of view: Proofs that do not use (Ax5)
yield formulas that are also valid for non-1nite output sets. The above completeness
result together with the examples (see below) indicates that the loss of (Ax5) is not
important.
6. Proving properties of specications
In this section we use the calculus for LF as given in the preceding subsection
to show some example proofs. Consider the LIFO-example from Section 2 and the
following valid formulas:
(∗) [in(a)]¬out = error,
(∗∗) [in(a1)] : : : [in(ak)][out]iout = ak−i, 06i¡k;
(∗∗∗) new→ [in(a1)] : : : [in(ak)][out]kout = error, 06k;
where [out]i is an abbreviation for i-times [out]. The meaning of (∗) is that after input
of a the queue is not empty. (∗∗) says that after k inputs and i¡k outputs a further
output yields the (k − i)th input value. (∗∗∗) states that starting with a newly created
queue and making k inputs and then as many outputs gives back an empty queue.
We give derivations in the calculus CF
−
. The last column tells how the current line
was derived. For example, (prop)(dist)(nec)(2) in the derivation below means that we
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applied rule (nec) to the formula derived in line 2, then used axiom (dist) and then
applied some propositional reasoning (in that case only (mp)) to derive the actual
formula.
First for (∗).
(1) [in(a)]out = a axiom from the spec,
(2) out = a→¬out = error (Ax4) from )F− ,
(3) [in(a)]out = a→[in(a)]¬out = error (prop)(dist)(nec) (2),
(4) [in(a)]¬out = error (mp)(1,3).
For (∗∗) let us see how things work for the instance
[in(a1)][in(a2)][in(a3)][in(a4)][out][out]out = a2:
The derivation is as follows:
(1) [in(a4)][out][out]out= a2↔ [out]out= a2 spec,
(2) [in(a3)][out]out= a2↔ out= a2 spec,
(3) [in(a2)]out= a2 spec,
(4) [in(a2)][in(a3)][out]out= a2↔ [in(a2)]out= a2 (prop)(dist)(nec) (2),
(5) [in(a2)][in(a3)][in(a4)][out][out]out= a2↔
[in(a2)][in(a3)][out]out= a2 (prop)(dist)(nec) (1),
(6) [in(a2)][in(a3)][in(a4)][out][out]out= a2 (prop)(3,4,5),
(7) [in(a1)][in(a2)][in(a3)][in(a4)][out][out]out= a2 (nec)(6).
The derivation of (∗∗∗) follows the same idea.
7. Coalgebraic logic as a specication language
So far, our treatment of speci1cations of objects and classes using modal logic
was inspired by regarding them as coalgebras. But the results we proved were ob-
tained by viewing coalgebras as Kripke models. In this respect, the general question
underlying our approach is: to what extent can coalgebras be considered as Kripke
models? Unfortunately, giving a uniform translation from coalgebras to transition sys-
tems for a larger variety of functors including exponentiation and powerset does seem
to yield rather complicated Kripke models that do not give rise to logics naturally
connected with the functor.
It is therefore natural to ask for a logic that depends in a canonical way on the functor
and is thus truly coalgebraic. Such a logic has recently been developed by Moss [19].
We show examples of speci1cations in coalgebraic logic and give a translation from
LF into coalgebraic logic.
7.1. Speci=cations in coalgebraic logic
First the de1nition of coalgebraic logic from [19] is given. For a detailed discussion
and results, the reader is referred to the original paper. We need the category SET of
classes and set-continuous functions. The functors F are on SET and have to be set-
based, standard and to preserve weak pullbacks. A functor F on Set can be extended
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(and will be where necessary without further mentioning) to a functor on SET by
de1ning FK =
⋃{FX :X ⊂K; X a set} for classes K . The F-language LF is de1ned
to be the least class satisfying
⊂LF ;  a set⇒
∧
 ∈LF ;
’ ∈LF ⇒¬’ ∈LF ;
’ ∈ FLF ⇒’ ∈LF :
Due to the 1rst clause LF is a proper class. The last clause uses the fact that F is a
functor on SET and as such can also be applied to classes of formulas. The second
clause is not a proper part of LF as de1ned in [19] but it is shown there that negation
may be added. Here, negation is needed only to simplify the writing of speci1cations.
Everything could be done using in1nitary disjunctions instead. The latter are really
needed: LF without negation and disjunction is strong enough to characterise every
state of a coalgebra up to bisimulation, but not strong enough to de1ne classes of
coalgebras.
Given a coalgebra (S; f) the semantics is given by the least relation |=F ⊂ S ×LF
such that
s |=F ’ for all ’ ∈ ;⊂LF ;  a set⇒ s |=F
∧
;
s =| F’⇒ s |=F ¬’;
there is w ∈ F(|=F) s:t: F!1(w) = f(s); F!2(w) = ’⇒ s |=F ’:
The last clause makes use of |=F being in SET and applies F to it. How it works is
best seen looking at some examples, see below. That |=F exists is shown in [19].
Now we can proceed to the examples. We do not consider here the axioms concern-
ing the newly created objects. Consider the 1rst three axioms of the one-cell buBer in
Section 4. In coalgebraic logic we can write them as (∗ being the error message)
(trueA; ∗)→ (.a:(trueA; (a; true)); ∗);
(trueA; (a; true))→ (.b:(trueA; (a; true)); (a; true));∨
{(trueA; z) : z ∈ 1 + A× {(trueA; ∗)}};
where trueA is the constant function A→{true}.
At 1rst sight the main diBerence is that we have no direct access to the single
components store and read (recall that store corresponds to the 1rst component, read
to the second). This is also the reason for the in1nite disjunctions in the third clause.
Let us take a close look at the 1rst clause. The premise (trueA; ∗) tells that read
yields error and speci1es nothing about the store. The conclusion (.a:(trueA; (a; true)); ∗)
says that we are in a state where the store is in accordance with .a:(trueA; (a; true))
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and the read yields error. Now, some thought shows that .a:(trueA; (a; true)) means
that storing a gives a state where (trueA; (a; true)) holds. And this formula describes
exactly those states where read yields a. The reader is invited to check this, paying
special attention to the third clause of the de1nition of |=F .
The LIFO-example. The axioms become
∨
z∈1+A×{true}
(.a:(trueA; (a; true)); z);

 ∨
z∈1+A×{true}
(.a:(trueA; (a; ’)); z)

↔ ’:
Note that the in1nite disjunctions are needed to express that the properties are inde-
pendent from the 1rst element in the queue. The next section shows that there is a
way to give access to the single components and thereby eliminating the disjunctions
from the specifying formulas and reintroducing the modal operators.
7.2. Translating modal logic into coalgebraic logic
Coalgebraic logic gives a general way to get a logic for coalgebras. But one dis-
advantage is that it lacks the intuitive box and diamond operators of modal logic.
Translating LF into LF means to render into coalgebraic logic the modal operators.
Denition 7.1 (Translation T from LF to LF). The boolean operators are translated
in the obvious way. For propositions and modal operators (using a; a′ ∈Ai; b∈Bi; c∈Ci;
’∈LF)
T ((i; a) = b) =
∨
{(g1; : : : ; gn) : gj ∈ Aj → Bj + Cj × {true}; gi(a) = b};
T ((i; a) = c) =
∨
{(g1; : : : ; gn) : gj ∈ Aj → Bj + Cj × {true}; gi(a) = (c; true)};
T ([i; a]’) =
∨
{(g1; : : : ; gn) : gj ∈ Aj → Bj + Cj × {true} for all j = i;
gi(a) ∈ Bi + Ci × {T (’)};
gi(a′) ∈ Bi + Ci × {true} for all a′ = a}:
The next proposition gives a characterisation of the translation of 〈i; a〉.
Proposition 7.2.
|=F T (〈i; a〉’)↔
∨
{(g1; : : : ; gn) : gj ∈ Aj → Bj + Cj × {true} for all j = i;
gi(a) ∈ Ci × {T (’)};
gi(a′) ∈ Bi + Ci × {true} for all a′ = a}:
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The next theorem states that speci1cations in the languageLF can also be considered
as speci1cations in coalgebraic logic.
Theorem 7.3. Let F be a functor on the category Set of the form F(S)= (B1 +
C1× S)A1 × · · · (Bn + Cn× S)An ; (S; f) a F-coalgebra and ’∈LF . Then
for all s ∈ S : s |=F ’ ⇔ s |=F T (’):
Proof. By induction on the structure of ’.
(i; a)= b: “⇒”: Suppose s |=F (i; a)= b. We have to 1nd w in F(|=F) such that
(F!1)(w)=f(s) and (F!2)(w) a formula of the disjunction. De1ne w to be a tuple
(w1; : : : ; wn) such that for all 16j6n, wj : Aj→Bj + Cj × (S ×LF) s.t.
wj(a) =
{
b if (!j ◦ f)(s)(a) = b;
(c; (t; true)) if (!j ◦ f)(s)(a) = (c; t):
“⇐”: Suppose there is a w∈F(|=F) such that (F!1)(w)=f(s) and (F!2)(w)= g
for a formula g of the disjunction. Then g=(g1; : : : ; gn) and gi(a)= b. Therefore
(!i ◦ f)(s)(a)= (!i ◦ F!1)(w)(a)= b.
(i; a)= c: Similar argument.
[i; a] : “⇒”: Choose w=(w1; : : : ; wn) such that for all 16j6n; j = i;
wj(a) =
{
b if (!j ◦ f)(s)(a) = b;
(c; (t; true)) if (!j ◦ f)(s)(a) = (c; t)
and
wi(a) =
{
b if (!i ◦ f)(s)(a) = b;
(c; (t; T ( ))) if (!i ◦ f)(s)(a) = (c; t):
As above F!1(w)=f(s) and F!2(w) is a formula of the disjunction. It remains to
show that w is indeed in F(|=F). This follows from the de1nition of |=F and the
induction hypothesis.
“⇐”: Suppose (!i ◦f)(s)(a)= (c; t). We have to show t |=F  . Let g be a for-
mula of the disjunction T ([i; a] ) with s |=F g. It follows that there is a w∈F( |=F )
s.t. F!1(w)=f(s); F!2(w)= g. Because of (!i ◦f)(s)(a)= (c; t) and the de1nition of g
we get (!i ◦F!1(w))(a)= (c; t) and (!i ◦F!2(w))(a)= (c; T ( )), hence (!i ◦w)(a)= (c;
(t; T ( ))). Therefore t |=F T ( ). By induction hypothesis it follows t |=F  .
8. Coalgebras, modal logic, and object orientation
The modal logic presented in this paper was designed to show that modal logics
provide a natural language to speak about coalgebras. It was not the aim to propose
a language capable of specifying fully Qedged object-oriented systems. This section
discusses possibilities and problems of developments in this direction.
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First, let us hint at possible extensions of our logic dealing with the issues of veri1-
cation, temporal speci1cations and inheritance. Concerning veri1cation, our formalism
only allows to specify properties of methods but not to verify correctness of imple-
mentations. This could be achieved by extending our logic by features of propositional
dynamic logic (PDL) 8 as follows. PDL is a modal logic that has modal operators [1]
for each statement 1 of a given imperative programming language. As in our logic, the
intended meaning of a modal formula [1]’ is: after all executions of the statement 1
proposition ’ holds. In addition, PDL has algebraic operations on the modalities cor-
responding to the operations allowing to form statements. For example [1]; [2] being
modalities of PDL, there is also a modality [1; 2], corresponding to the composition
operator “;” in the programming language. The intended meaning of the operations on
the modalities is expressed by certain axioms (for example [1; 2]’↔ [1][2]’). In this
way, using PDL as a logic on the level of the programming language and thinking
of the formulas of our logic as special PDL formulas, we could use the (complete)
calculus for PDL to verify that some implementation meets the speci1cations written
in our logic.
We might also be interested in extending our logic with modal operators that allow
to specify safety and liveness properties. In principle, the coalgebras being isomorphic
to Kripke models, it is straight forward to use any of the many temporal logics designed
for Kripke models like linear temporal logic or CTL∗. For example, we may add to
our logic two operators ◦ and and interpret ◦ by 9 R◦= ⋃i; a Ri; a and R by the
reQexive and transitive closure of R◦. Hence ◦’ means “whatever is the method to
be executed next, after its execution ’ will hold” and is the corresponding always
operator. But there is a technical problem due to the possibility of in1nitely many
modal operators [i; a] : To get a reasonable calculus we need to be able to infer ◦’
from the in1nitely many premises {[i; a]’ : for all i; a}. Admitting a calculus with
in1nitary rules (but no in1nitary formulas) and using as an essential ingredient the
in1nitary rule {[i; a]’ : for all i; a}◦’, it is possible to give a complete calculus for
a temporal logic for coalgebras with operators ◦ and . The completeness proof uses
the technique developed in [23] (but see also Goldblatt [6]).
How reasoning about inheritance could be integrated into our framework remains to
be investigated. One approach that seems promising is to build on work by Uustalu
[24] who gives modal logics to treat various aspects of inheritance.
Having discussed possibilities to deal with veri1cation, temporal speci1cations, and
inheritance we come to the main point concerning coalgebras and the OO-paradigm.
It is still an open question how to deal with concurrency and communication inside
the coalgebraic approach. Note that this point is also related to the question of how to
model shared objects: Once we have a communication mechanism shared objects can
be treated just as objects linked to the owners by message passing. And vice versa,
shared objects could be used to model communication.
8 For more information on PDL see e.g. Goldblatt [5].
9 Recall from Section 5.1 that the Ri; a are the relations interpreting the operators [i; a].
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In order to further illustrate the issue we compare the coalgebraic approach with
the one using distributed temporal logic (DTL), see [4] for an overview and further
references and [9] for using DTL to give a complete semantics to the object-oriented
speci1cation language TROLL [2]. The DTL approach is based on the view of objects
as autonomous sequential agents capable of synchronous communication. Each object
is modelled by a labelled sequential event structure. Synchronous communication is
modelled by objects sharing the same event. Formulas of the logic are interpreted only
locally w.r.t. a speci1c object. But formulas allow to express that an object shares an
event with another object. For example, a formula local to object i may specify certain
properties that have to hold for a diBerent object j at the time when a common event
is shared between i and j. Also, treating actions like transactions in database theory it
is possible to give a logic invariant under change of granularity and thus supporting
re1nement proofs [3].
We think that the coalgebraic approach and the object-as-agent approach are in
some sense orthogonal. The coalgebraic approach emphasises classes, e.g. it leads to
canonical notions of invariance and bisimulation for a class. Using PVS, it has been
used by Jacobs and others [15, 10, 16] to implement veri1cation tools for (parts of)
Java. The features handled are mainly those related to the class structure of the system
like inheritance, overriding, and late binding. Another way to put it is to say that
the coalgebraic approach as understood today is well suited to deal with the static
features of an object-oriented system 10 but it is not clear how to integrate dynamic
aspects like communication and concurrency. This is also highlighted by the work of
Cenciarelli et al. [1] who give an event-based semantics of Java dealing with threads
and concurrency. Whereas this semantics is conceptually not too far away from the
DTL approach it has, up to now, resisted all eBorts to combine it with a coalgebraic
approach.
The object-as-agent approach emphasises objects. It allows for a natural treatment
of communication and concurrency but seems to be less suited to deal with aspects
related to classes. Also it has not yet led to veri1cation tools.
One way to combine both worlds has already been presented in Reichel [20]. We
think it is promising to continue this line of research and to try to develop a logical
framework allowing to deal with both worlds in coherent way. There is the possibility
that modal logics may play a major role in it, allowing to be used for diBerent purposes
as describing imperative programs, specifying objects and classes, communication and
concurrency. As mentioned already, this would give us the very powerful machinery
of modal logic at hand, with all its results concerning completeness, de1nability, de-
cidability. And – important for specifying and verifying programs – with all its tools
like interactive theorem provers and model checkers.
10 Late binding may be considered a dynamic concept but it can be handled in a static way, see [17].
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9. Conclusion
We have seen that by conceiving of coalgebras as Kripke models modal logic may
be used as a logic for coalgebras. It just has been sketched what may be achieved by
this approach. The kind of the functors considered should be extended to include at
least the powerset functor. Concerning the speci1cation of classes and objects it would
be interesting to include temporal reasoning allowing for the speci1cation of safety
and liveness properties. Further topics include inheritance, re1nement, compositional-
ity, communication and veri1cation. Also extensions of the logic by quanti1cation or
in1nitary conjunctions should be considered. More general questions concern the re-
lation between equational and modal speci1cations. And whether there is a way to
conceive of modal logic as a dual of equational logic (cf. the duality between modal
algebras and Kripke models). 11
I hope to have shown that modal logic may contribute interesting tools and results
as well as some new questions to the theory of coalgebras.
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